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State Department review completed

TOP SECRET

SUMMARY

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GENERAL

1. Comment on the Latin Union Congress in Brazil:

The Latin Union, which was founded in Paris in 1946 by Brazilian Foreign Minister Neves da Fontoura, is scheduled to meet on 14 October in Rio de Janeiro. Representatives are expected from Spain, Italy, France, Portugal, Belgium, and most of the Latin American countries, and observers have been invited from the UK, the US, Holland, and one of the Rumanian exile groups.

The agenda calls for 'an affirmation of the spiritual and cultural solidarity" of the Latin Union, and proposes a study of practical methods to utilize this cultural bloc in United Nations activities. This meeting provides an opportunity for elaboration of the well-worn thesis of some of the participants that Latin culture is seriously threatened not only by Soviet communism but also by US materialism; US officials fear that anti-US elements may obtain considerable publicity for their views.

The Brazilian Foreign Minister has assured the US Ambassador that the French were the prime movers behind the congress, and has manifested some unhappiness at the prospect of the meeting. The French Ambassador in Rio, however, has reported that the Brazilian Foreign Minister is personally interested in the congress, but that certain people in Rio were trying to attribute French paternity to the plan. He disclaimed any knowledge of "the motives or even the names of the true promoters," and recommended that the French Government maintain its "attitude of reserve" until the purpose of the organization became clear.

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25X1A Approved For Release 2004/01/16: CIA-RDP79T00975A000400190001-6 Comment: The short-run results of the current dry season operations in Indochina have been favorable to the French. As long as battle casualties and the climate claim a heavy toll of French forces, however, there is little prospect that the French can achieve a decisive victory. SOUTH ASIA Anti-British sentiment may extend to Pakistan: An influential, conservative Pakistani newspaper has suggested in a leading editorial that popular demonstrations might be the most effective means of calling international attention to Pakistan's concern over the Kashmir The paper cites the effectiveness of such demonstrations in Iran problem. and Egypt. On 10 October the student bodies of all colleges and universities in Karachi held meetings to organize a plan for action regarding Kashmir. The US Embassy in Karachi states that, if the Pakistani Government permits the rise of popular emotion regarding Kashmir, it will increase the risk of war and possibly include Pakistan in a chain reaction of anti-British maneuvers subject to exploitation by dissident elements. Comment: Anti-British feeling in Pakistan might crystallize in a quit-the-Commonwealth movement.

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EASTERN EUROPE 8. Interview with Tito regarding US military advisory group inconclusive with Marshal Tito concerning the size an duties of the proposed US military advisory group was inconclusive. Tito declared inspection of Yugoslav army installations and depots by American officers would undermine the very basis for the "high Yugoslav army morale" and that he would forego all American military aid rather than risk creating the impression among his troops that the US had assumed the role the USSR previously held in Yugoslav Tito conceded, however, that a written agreement regarding the size and functions of the group was unnecessa and that the approach should be more flexible. He thought that the Yugoslav Government itself might well suggest a considerably larger group once the program was well underway, particularly if, as he hope strategic discussions had been started. - 7 -	2	25X1			
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advisers in Yugoslavia poses a real problem for the Tito regime. In addition to harboring some suspicion that his unsavory experience with the Soviet military mission prior to 1948 may be repeated, Tito probably fears that activities of the US military group will create further dissension within the Party.

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